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LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AND GOVERNMENTAL
EMPLOYEES TORT IMMUNITY ACT AN OVERREACTION TO HARVEY
The Illinois General Assembly by an act of August 13, 1965
adopted the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act., This Act represents the first attempt on
the part of the General Assembly to afford uniform treatment to
all units of local government in the area of governmental tort
immunity.2 Prior to the adoption of the Tort Immunity Act, a
legislative pattern had been developed under which selected governmental units enjoyed varying degrees of tort immunity3
This was the result of the General Assembly's hasty reaction to
the Illinois Supreme Court's landmark decision in Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit DistrictNo. 302.1
Molitor abolished the judicially created doctrine of partial
immunity for torts as applied to school districts and set the stage
for similar attacks upon the patchwork of court-made immunity
for similar governmental entities.5 The General Assembly's solution to Molitor was to substitute a legislative pattern of governmental tort immunity for existing judicially created immunity.
However, by 1965 serious doubt existed as to whether governmental units would continue to enjoy any form of tort immunity
unless uniform legislation were to be created. This was readily
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §1-101 to 10-101 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Tort Immunity Act.]
2
See generally Kionka, Tort Liability of Local Governments and Their

Employees in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 620 (1970) ; and Latturner, Local Governmental Tort Immunity and Liability in Illinois, 55 ILL. B.J. 28 (1966).
3For example, school districts and non-profit private schools were
afforded a liability ceiling of $10,000 and were further protected by a oneyear statute of limitations provision and a six-month notice of suit provision.
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 122, §821-31 (1963). Forest preserve districts had no
liability for negligence at all. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 , §3(a) (1963). A
maximum liability of $10,000 was established for county superintendents of
highways. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, §381-87 (1963). Park districts and counties had general immunity from negligence actions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105,
§12.1-1 (1963). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §301.1 (1963).
4 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).

5Id. Although the Molitor decision only applied to judicially created
immunity for school districts, the Illinois Supreme Court expressed a general
dislike for judicially created tort immunity:
It is a basic concept underlying the whole law of torts today that
liability follows negligence, and that individuals and corporations are
responsible for the negligence of their agents and employees acting in
the course of their employment. The doctrine of governmental immunity
runs directly counter to that basic concept. What reasons, then, are
so impelling as to allow a school district, as a quasi-municipal corporation, to commit any wrongdoing without any responsibility to its victims,
while any individual or private corporation would be called to task in
court for such tortious conduct?
Id. at 20, 163 N.E.2d at 93.
Shortly after Molitor was decided, the General Assembly buffered the
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apparent after the Illinois Supreme Court's6 decision in Harvey
v. Clyde Park District in November, 1964.
In Harvey, suit was brought on behalf of a minor plaintiff
to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of
the negligence of the defendant park district in maintaining
playground facilities under its control. The defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint asserting immunity from suit under section 12.1-1 of the Park District Code. 7 Section 12.1-1 was a
general immunity provision insulating the park district from
liability for the negligence of its employees. Section 12.1-1
provided:
Any park district shall not be liable for any injuries to person or
property ... heretofore or hereinafter caused by or resulting from
the negligence of its agents, servants, officers or employees in the
operation or maintenance of any property, equipment or facility
under the jurisdiction, control or custody of the park district,
or otherwise occasioned by the acts or conduct of such agents,
servants, officers or employees.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in deciding for the plaintiff,
held that the classification created by section 12.1-1 was not ra-

tional and that it unconstitutionally discriminated against the
plaintiff in violation of the special legislation prohibition con-

tained in article IV, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution.8 That
section provides: "The General Assembly shall not pass local or
special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to
say: For . . . [g] ranting to any corporation, association or in-

dividual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise
whatsoever."9
The court, relying upon Grasse v. Dealers Transport Co., 10

reasoned:
For more is involved here than just the classification of governmental units. Those persons who are injured by the negligence of
effect of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision by enacting tort immunity
legislation designed to protect selected governmental units. See note 3
supra. Molitor is still the law, however, and in the absence of valid statutory grants of tort immunity, local governmental units are liable in tort
to the same extent as individuals. Grasso v. Kucharski, 93 Ill. App. 2d
233, 236 N.E.2d 262 (1968).
6 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964). Harvey was the first case in
which the constitutionality of the post Molitor immunity legislation was
tested. The specific immunity legislation attacked was section 12.1-1 of the
Park District Code, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 105, §12.1-1 (1963). Section 12.1-1
was held to violate the prohibition against special legislation contained in
article IV, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution of 1870.
7 ILL. Rnv. STAT.

ch. 105, §12.1-1 (1963).

Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
9 ILL. CONST. art. IV, §22 (1870).
10412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
The court in Harvey was guided by the reasoning in Grasse. In support
of its holding that the classification created by section 12.1-1 was not rational,
the Harvey court looked to Grasse for support:
The situation in this case is not unlike that which was before this
court in Grasse v. Dealers' Transport Co. Section 29 of the Workmen's
8
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particular governmental units are also classified, and section 22 of
article IV prohibits the granting of "special or exclusive" privileges
to individuals. 1 '

By applying different measures of immunity to various governmental units, the legislature had in effect created a secondary
classification with respect to governmental units which discriminated against the plaintiff. Plaintiff's right to recover was
based solely upon whether the defendant happened to be covered
by the Act. In support of this reasoning, the court postulated:
So far as the present case is concerned, cities and villages,
park districts, school districts and forest preserve districts as well
as the State itself, all maintain recreational facilities that are
available for public use. If the child involved in the present case
had been injured on a slide negligently maintained in a park
operated by a city or village there is no legislative impediment to
full recovery. If the child had been injured on a slide negligently
maintained by a school district, or by the sovereign State, limited
recovery is permitted. But if the child had been injured on a slide
negligently maintained by a forest preserve district, or, as was
actually the case, by a park district, the legislature has barred
recovery. In this pattern there is no discernible relationship to the
realities of life.12

The effect of Harvey was to open the door for constitutional

attack under article IV, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution
upon any of the then existing legislative grants of tort immunity

to governmental bodies created in the wake of Molitor. The
court was undoubtedly aware of the impact its decision would
have in the area of governmental tort immunity when it suggested the following guideline for future legislation:
From this decision it does not follow that no valid classifications for purposes of municipal tort liability are possible. On the
Compensation Act allowed a common law action by an employee who
was injured by the negligence of a third party who was not bound by
the Act, but prohibited such an action by an employee who was injured
by the negligence of a third party who was bound by the Act. The distinction between the two types of defendants was held insufficient to
afford a rational basis of classification from the point of view of the
injured person. The court said: "All employees entitled to compensation
for injuries sustained in the course of employment and caused by third
persons are not treated alike .... [tihose injured by third party tortfeasors not bound by the Act are allowed to institute actions for
damages. Both classes of injured employees may be entitled to compensation from their own employers, so that the amount of compensation, if any, received by the injured employee is not the basis for
differentiation between the classes. Nor is there any basis for differentiation from the nature of the injuries sustained, or of the activity
of the employees at the time of the injury, or from any other factor
ordinarily related to the injured party's right to recover damages. The
sole basis for differentiation, as far as the injured employee is concerned,
is a fortuitous circumstance - whether the third party tort-feasor [sic]
happens to be under the Act."
Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 65-66, 203 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1964).
"Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 65, 203 N.E.2d 573,
576 (1964).
(Emphasis added.)
12 Id. at 66-67, 203 N.E.2d at 576-77.
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contrary it is feasible, and it may be thought desirable, to classify
in terms of types of municipal function, instead of classifying
among different governmental agencies that perform the same
function. 18
The court therefore suggested that for the purposes of article
IV, section 22, classification on a functional basis would be per
se reasonable. From this it is implied that governmental agencies performing different functions may be classified in the same
group with other governmental agencies, but that in any case
all governmental agencies performing the same functions must
be treated uniformly. All governmental agencies which perform
the same function must, by this standard, be afforded the same
degree of immunity from suit if tort immunity is to survive an
article IV, section 22 attack.
Although the court in Harvey never defined the term "function," providing playground facilities was the function of the
defendant park district as applied to the plaintiff in that case.
The pitfall of the legislation in Harvey was that other governmental agencies which also provided playground facilities were
not afforded the same degree of tort immunity as was the park
district under section 12.1-1 of the Park District Code. Whereas
section 12.1-1 prohibited suit against park districts for damages
due to injuries resulting from the negligent maintenance of recreational facilities under the control of the park district, no
similar prohibition existed for suits on similar grounds against
a city or village, and only limited recovery was available for
similar suits against school districts or the state.4
The General Assembly wasted little time in adopting a
statute designed to overcome the pitfalls of the legislation in
Harvey. On August 13, 1965, the Tort Immunity Act was enacted. 15 Speaking of this Act, the court in Ritsema-Millgard,Inc.
v. Mich~ael J. McDermott Co.,' stated:
In 1965 the Illinois legislature adopted the Local Government and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. This act was
adopted immediately after the Illinois Supreme Court had repudiated the last vestige of the doctrine of governmental immunity. It
was intended to assure uniformity in treatment to all units of local
government and to salvage certain protections for public entities
some of which had found themselves subject to suit for the first
time.17
Adoption of the Tort Immunity Act was timely, for the fears
13 Id. at 67, 203 N.E.2d at 577.
14 Id.
15 The opinion in Harvey was filed on November 4, 1964 and was modified
on denial of rehearing on January 19, 1965. The second draft of the proposed legislation, with amendments, was introduced in the 1965 General
Assembly and enacted August 13, 1965.
16 295 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
17 Id. at 180.
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predicated upon the decision in Harvey soon became a reality. In
1966, the statute which granted counties immunity from negligence actions 8 was held unconstitutional as special legislation. 19
Similarly, the sections of the School Code 20 providing for a sixmonth notice of injury for suits against school districts and nonprofit private schools were held unconstitutional as special legislation. 21 Further, Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago22 ruled
unconstitutional the $10,000 limit of the School Code 23 applicable
to non-profit private schools. Thus the post Molitor legislation
began to crumble. It is to be noted that Molitor is still the law
in Illinois and, in the absence of valid statutory limitations on
tort liability, governmental entities are subject to the same degree of tort liability as individuals'
TORT IMMUNITY ACT

At least upon its face, the Tort Immunity Act would appear
to overcome any special legislation objections predicated upon
Harvey. Legislation which treats all governmental units uniformly with respect to tort immunity cannot be said to create
secondary classifications which might discriminate against potential plaintiffs. Nor can there be any doubt that a classification is defined functionally if all potential units which may conceivably perform the same function are classified in the same
group. However, the Tort Immunity Act deserves closer scrutiny.
The Tort Immunity Act is a comprehensive grant of immunity from all torts and for all governmental units covered
18 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §301.1 (1963).

Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill. 2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966).
ILL REv. STAT. ch. 122, §823-824 (1965).
21 Lorton v. Brown County School Dist., 35 Ill. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161
(1966). Lorton relied directly upon the rationale of Harvey to strike down
the six-month notice provision of The School Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
§823-824 (1965), as violative of the special legislation prohibition of article
IV, section 22. The court drew an analogy to Harvey:
We believe the rationale of Harvey is controlling here, for if plaintiff's injury had occurred upon the property of a county township or
drainage district, her cause of action would not have been barred by
failure to file written notice within six months of the injury. If, however, the injury had occurred upon the property of a city or village,
public or private school, as was actually the case, or the Metropolitan
Transit Authority, the failure to file written notice within six months
from the date of injury would wholly bar her from recovery. As in
Ha'vey, there is in this pattern "no discernible relationship to the
realities of life.". . . The courts of this state must be open to all those
similarly situated upon the same conditions, and where procedures are
provided which are applicable to some and not applicable to others under
substantially like circumstances and there are no discernible logical
reasons apparent for the variations, they must fall as violative of section
22 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution.
Id. at 365-366, 220 N.E.2d at 163.
2d 336, 243 N.E.2d 203 (1968).
22 41 Ill.
" 23 ILL. REV..STAT cl. 122, §825 (B) -(1967).
4
2 Grasso v. Kucharski, 93 111. App. 2d 233, 236 N.E.2d 262 (1968).
19

26
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Categorically, immunity provisions are divided as
general provisions relating to immunity of local

public entities, 25 (2) general immunity provisions for public
employees, 26 (3) immunity from liability for injury occurring in
the use of public property, 27 (4) immunity relating to police or

correctional activities, 28 (5) immunity for fire protection activirelating to medical, hospital and public
ties, 29 and (6) immunities
80
health activities.
The scope of the Act is further broadened by the definition
of "local public entity," which includes every possible governmental unit except the state itself." The definition of "employee" as
given a greater scope than contemused in the Act is likewise
2
plated at common law.8
The wording of these
25 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-101 to 2-111 (1969).
sections is such that the general immunity provisions contained therein
apply to all local public entities. Therefore, at least within the purview of
the Tort Immunity Act, all local public entities which perform the same
functions are treated alike. Thus the functional classification requirement
of Harvey would appear to have been met.
Section 2-102 provides that no local public entity is liable to pay punitive
Specific
or exemplary damages. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-102 (1969).
provisions immunize all local public entities from liability flowing from the
following: adoption or failure to adopt an enactment or failure to enforce
a law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-103 (1969) ; issuance, denial, suspension or
revocation of or refusal or failure to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any
permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization where
the entity or its employee is authorized by enactment to determine whether
or not such authorization should be issued, denied, suspended or revoked,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-104 (1969) ; an oral promise or misrepresentation
of its employee, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-106 (1969); any action by its
employees that is libelous or slanderous, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-107 (1969).
Section 2-109 provides: "a local public entity is not liable for an injury
resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not
liable." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-109 (1969). In Mills v. County of Winnebago, 104 Ill. App. 2d 366, 244 N.E.2d 65 (1969), the court interpreted section
2-109 to prevent suit against the county for acts of wilful and wanton misconduct caused by the defendant's employee even though a separate action
could have been maintained against the employee directly.
26 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-201 to 2-212 (1969).
However, Young v.
Hansen, 110 Ill. App. 2d 376, 249 N.E.2d 300 (1969), held that a public official
may not hide behind the cloak of immunity provided by the Tort Immunity
Act if he maliciously and intentionally misuses the powers of his office.
27 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §3-101 to 3-108 (1969).
28 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §4-101 to 4-107 (1969).
29 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §5-101 to 5-103 (1969).
'o ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §6-101 to 6-109 (1969).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §1-206 (1969).
That section provides:
"[1local public entity" includes a county, township, municipality,
municipal corporation, school district, school board, forest preserve
district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district, and
all other local governmental bodies. It does not include the State or any
office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission, university
or similar agency of the State.
It is to be noted, however, that section 2-101 (b) specifically excepts
from the Tort Immunity Act any entity organized under the Metropolitan
Transit Authority Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-%, §301 et seq. (1969).
The Metropolitan Transit
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-101 (b) (1969).
Authority is a municipal corporation, i.e., a local public entity, which does
not come under the workings of the Tort Immunity Act.
32 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §1-202 (1969).
Under this section, an "employee" includes an officer, member of a board, commission or committee,
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In addition to the general and specific grants of immunity
provided for by the Tort Immunity Act, local public entities
are further shielded against all tort actions by procedural limitations. The six-month notice of injury provision3 3 and the one-

year statute of limitations provision 84 were borrowed from prior
law and retain the basic parlance of those actions.35 Although
the six-month notice of injury provision applies with equal force
to all tort actions brought against local public entities or their

employees, the one-year statute of limitations applies to suits
brought against local public entities only. Failure to comply
with a notice provision will result in an involuntary dismissal of
the cause of action and will be res judicata in further proceedings 6
As has been seen, the notice provision and limitations pro-

vision of the Tort Immunity Act are not new innovations in the
area of governmental tort immunity.

Some of these earlier pro-

37
visions have been held unconstitutional by judicial decision

servant or employee, whether or not compensated, but does not include an
independent contractor.
33ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, §8-102 (1969).
That section provides:
Within 6 months from the date that the injury or cause of action...
was received or accrued, any person who is about to commence any civil
action for damages on account of such injury against a local public
entity, or against any of its employees whose act or omission committed
while acting in the scope of his employment as such employee caused
the injury, must personally serve in the Office of the Secretary or Clerk,
as the case may be, for the entity against whom or against whose employee the action is contemplated a written statement, signed by himself,
his agent or attorney, giving the name of the person to whom the cause
of action has accrued, the name and residence of the person injured, the
date and about the hour of the accident, the place or location where the
accident occurred, the general nature of the accident, the name and
address of the attending physician if any and the name and address of
the treating hospital or hospitals, ii any. (as amended October 10, 1969].
The six-month notice provision is substantially similar in form to that
required for suits against the state under the Illinois Court of Claims Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §439.22-2 (1969), and against the Metropolitan
Transit Authority under the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. Ill-%, §341 (1969).
34ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, §8-101 (1969). That section provides: "No
civil action may be commenced in any court against a local public entity for
any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the
injury was received or the cause of action accrued."
Compare this with the two-year statute of limitation for personal injury
actions against the State of Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, F439.22 (1969),
and the general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, §15 (1969).
35 Ritsema-Millgard v. McDermott Co., 295 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
36 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §8-103 (1969), provides:

If the notice under section 8-102 is not served as provided therein, any
such civil action commenced against a local public entity, or against any
of its employees whose act or omission committed while acting in the
scope of his employment as such employee caused the injury, shall be
dismissed and the person to whom such cause of injury accrued shall be
forever barred from further suing.
See, e.g., Fannon v. Aurora, 106 Ill. App. 2d 408, 245 N.E.2d 286 (1969).
87 Lorton v. Brown County School Dist., 35 Ill. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161
(1966), invalidated the six-month notice provision of The School Code, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 122, §823-24 (1963).

118

The John MarshallJournal of Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 4:111

while others have been expressly repealed by the Tort Immunity
Act 8 Other similar provisions remain in effect in spite of the
Tort Immunity Act.3 9 It is the existence of these other statutory
provisions which may invalidate the notice and limitations pro-

visions of the Tort Immunity Act under the rationale of Harvey.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF NOTICE AND

LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS

Before suggesting invalidation of the notice and limitations
provisions of the Tort Immunity Act, it is worthwhile reviewing several recent decisions which have construed these provisions. To date, only twenty cases have construed the provisions

of the Tort Immunity Act.40 Exactly one-half of these cases have
concerned the notice and limitations provisions.41 In no case,
however, has the constitutionality of these provisions been adj udicated.
88 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §10-101 (1969).
39 The Tort Immunity Act provides:

Nothing in this Act affects the liability, if any, of a local public
entity or public employee, based on:
b) operation as a common carrier; and this act does not apply to
any entity organized under or subject to the "Metropolitan Transit
Authority Act", approved April 12, 1945, as amended; ...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §2-101(1969).
The Metropolitan Transit Authority Act provides for a one-year statute
of limitations for any civil action for personal injuries against the Authority
and for a six-month notice of injury. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-%, §341 (1969).
There are no general immunity provisions beyond the procedural requirements specified in the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act.
The Illinois Court of Claims Act provides for a two-year statute of
limitations for tort actions against the State of Illinois and agencies of
the state, except where the plaintiff is an infant, idiot, lunatic, insane person,
or person under other disability at the time the claim accrues, in which case
he is allowed two years to file suit from the time the disability ceases. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37, §439.22 (1969).
Furthermore, a six-month notice is
required as a condition precedent to suit against the state. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, §439.22 (1969).
Unlike the Tort Immunity Act, the Illinois Court of Claims Act sets a
monetary limit of $25,000 on recovery for all tort actions. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, §439.8 (1969).
40 Kerr v. Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1970); Skrapits v. Skala,
314 F. Supp. 510 (1970); Ritsema-Millgard v. McDermott Co., 295 F. Supp.
180 (N.D. 11. 1969) ; Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (1967) ; Van Meter v.
Stout, 45 Ill. 2d 784, 256 N.E.2d 784 (1970) ; Edelen v. Hogsett, 44 Ill. 2d 215,
244 N.E.2d 435 (1969) ; Hoffman v. Evans,
Ill. App. 2d.
263 N.E.2d 140
(1970) ; Dear v. Locke, 128 Ill. App. 2d 356, 262 N.E .2d 27 (1970) ; Smith
v. Glowacki, 122 Ill. App. 2d 336, 258 N.E.2d 591 (1970); Meyers v.
Bd. of Educ., 121 Ill. App. 2d 186, 257 N.E.2d 183 (1970); McLaughlin
v. Tilendis, 115 Ill. App. 2d 148, 253 N.E.2d 85 (1969); Young v. Hansen,
110 Il. App. 2d 376, 249 N.E.2d 300 (1969) ; Fannon v. Aurora, 106 Ill. App.
2d 408, 245 N.E.2d 286 (1969); Sappington v. Sparta Municipal Hospital
Dist., 106 Ill. App. 2d 255. 245 N.E.2d 262 (1969) ; Schear v. Highland Park,
104 Ill. App. 2d 285, 244 N.E.2d 72 (1968); Mills v. County of Winnebago,
104 Ill. App. 2d 366, 244 N.E.2d 65 (1969); Woodman v. Litchfield School
Dist., 102 Ill. App. 2d 780, 242 N.E.2d 780 (1968); Jones v. Rock Island,
101 Ill. App. 2d 174. 242 N.E.2d 302 (1968) ; Wills v. Metz, 89 Ill. App. 2d
334, 231 N.E.2d 628 (1967); Andrews v. Porter, 70 Ill. App. 2d 202, 217
N.E.2d 305 (1966).
41 Skrapits v. $kala, 314 F. Supp. 510 (1970); Ritsema-Millgard _V.
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Wills v. Metz, 42 relying upon the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,4 declared that
the six-month notice provision did not apply in suits brought on
behalf of a minor plaintiff by his next friend. In Wills, the plaintiff was 19 years, 10 months and 22 days of age when the suit
was brought. Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleging
personal injuries and property damages was dismissed upon
motion of the defendant that plaintiff did not file a timely notice
of suit as required by section 8-102 of the Tort Immunity Act.
On appeal, the defendant urged a distinction between the status
of the plaintiff in that case and the plaintiffs in Haymes and previous cases. It was urged that in Haymes and in the line of
cases relied upon by Haymes, the plaintiffs were in fact physically or mentally incapable of compliance with the provisions by
reason of young and tender years, and that with regard to plaintiff Wills, no disability is suggested as to the reason for noncompliance with the notice requirement. The court, however,
in rejecting the defendant's contention, reasoned that physical

age alone is sufficient to excuse compliance with the notice provision:
We read the Haymes case and its predecessors as making a distinction between minors and adults. The line of demarcation is not
one of physical or mental capacity to give the notice but one of
ascertaining whether or not the plaintiff is or is not a minor. In
this case, the plaintiff was a minor and the notice requirement
of
44
section 8-102 was not applicable to nor binding upon him.

McDermott Co., 295 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ill. 1969) ; Van Meter v. Stout, 45 Ill.
2d 7, 256 N.E.2d 784 (1970) ; Hoffman v. Evans, Ill. App. 2d , 263 N.E.2d
140 (1970) ; Dear v. Locke, 128 Ill. App. 2d 356, 262 N.E.2d 27 (1970) ; Smith
v. Glowacki, 122 Ill. App. 2d 336, 258 N.E.2d 591 (1970) ; Fannon v. Aurora,
106 Ill. App. 2d 408, 245 N.E.2d 286 (1969) ; Sappington v. Sparta Municipal
Hospital Dist., 106 Ill. App. 2d 255, 245 N.E.2d 262 (1969) ; Schear v. Highland Park, 104 Ill. App. 2d 285, 244 N.E.2d 72 (1968) ; Wills v. Metz, 89 Ill.
App. 2d 334, 231 N.E.2d 628 (1967).
4289 Ill. App. 2d 334, 231 N.E.2d 628 (1967).
43 33 Ill. 2d 425, 211 N.E.2d 690 (1965).
In Haymes, the question was
p resented whether the six-month notice requirement of the School Tort
iability Act was binding upon minor plaintiffs. In holding that it was not,
the court stated:
Moreover we agree with the appellate court in that the language-of
section 3 is virtually identical with the notice-of-claim provision of the
Cities and Villages Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 24, par. 1-4-2),
which statute, with only minor changes, is the same today as at the time
of enactment in 1905. In 1918, this court in McDonald v. City of Spring
Valley, 285 Ill. 52, held the notice provision of the Cities and Villages
Act not applicable to minors, and this case has been followed without
exception ....

It is apparent to us that the legislature in enacting

section 3 of the School Tort Liability Act was aware of our holding in
McDonald, and therefore must have intended that section not to be applicable to minor claimants. If notice were to be required of a minor who
cannot make a legally binding appointment of an agent or attorney, the
legislature could have provided for notice by a next friend or legal
guardian, but it has not seen fit so to provide.
Id. at 428, 211 N.E.2d at 692.,
4489 Ill. App. 2d 334,337; 231 N.E.2d 628, 630 (19.67Y.

120

The John MarshallJournal of Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 4:111

4' 5
the notice provision
In Schear v. City of Highland Park,

was held not to be applied retroactively to bar causes of action
which accrued prior to the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act.
Plaintiff on May 5, 1967 filed an action for personal injuries
allegedly resulting from the negligence of the defendant city
employee when a motor vehicle driven by the employee and owned
by the city of Highland Park collided with a vehicle driven by
the plaintiff. The injuries occurred on July 1, 1965. On June
16, 1967 an amended complaint was filed making the city of
Highland Park an additional defendant. Subsequently, both defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint setting
forth the one-year limitations provision and six-month notice
provision of the Tort Immunity Act, as well as certain provisions
of the Cities and Villages Act.4" The circuit court dismissed the
complaint as to both defendants.
The appellate court held that the complaint was improperly
dismissed as to the defendant employee and reversed the circuit
court's finding that the notice provision of the Tort Immunity
47
Act was procedural and entitled to retroactive application.
This issue was not raised as to the defendant City of Highland
Park since the city was at all-times protected by virtue of the
notice provisions of either the Cities and' Villages Act 48 or section
8-102 of the Tort Immunity Act. The notice provision of the
Cities and Villages Act immunized only municipalities and did
not apply to suits against employees of municipalities. The court
stated:
At the time of the accident, it was not a prerequisite to a suit
against Shelton that any notice be filed. This requirement did not
apply to suits against city employees until the new Act became
effective on August 13, 1965. We disagree with the lower court
that this requirement can be applied retroactively since it is
merely "procedural." Failure to comply is a complete bar to the
action and we, therefore, regard the requirement as a matter of

substance rather than procedure. We think it clear that the retroactive application of the notice requirement would deprive the
plaintiff of a cause of action which49 had accrued prior to the time
the requirement first became law.
45 104 Ill. App. 2d 285, 244 N.E.2d 72 (1968).

46 The portions of the Cities and Villages Act asserted by the defendant
were ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §1-4-1, 1-4-2, 1-4-3 (1963). These sections were
repealed by section 10-101 of the Tort Immunity Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
85, §10-101 (1969).
Section 1-4-1 provided for a one-year statute of limitations in personal
injury actions against municipalities. Section 1-4-2 provided for a six-month
notice by persons contemplating suit against any municipality for damages
on account of any injury to his person. Under section 1-4-3, if the notice
required by section 1-4-2 was not given, the suit would be dismissed with
prejudice.
47104
I1. App. 2d 285, 244 N.E.2d 72 (1968).
48 ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 24, §§1-4-2, 1-4-8 (1968).
49 104 Ill. App. 2d 285, 289, 244 N.E.2d 72, 74 (1968).
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The court further reasoned that no clear legislative intention to
the contrary was indicated by the language of the Tort Immunity
Act.
Fannon v. City of Aurora,o in construing the requirement
of personal service of notice contained in section 8-102,51 held
that service of notice on the proper authorities by registered mail
was not personal service as contemplated by the Act. The court
reasoned that section 8-102 does not require the plaintiff himself
to personally deliver the notice but that the notice may instead
be delivered through an agent. The Act does, however, require
a service in person and the Post Office is not a proper agent to
make such service. Further, Sappington v. Sparta Municipal
HospitalDistrict 52 held that the formal notice required by section
8-102 was necessary even though there was evidence that the
local public entity had or should have had actual notice through
its employees due to the fact that, in the course of the plaintiff's
treatment during the first three days after his injury, the basic
information required by the notice was conveyed to the attending
physician and nurse. The court, rejecting plaintiff's contention
that under such circumstances no formal notice was necessary,
analyzed the reason for such formal notice:
The giving of a formal notice permits the defendant time to attempt to settle the case before suit is filed. It also lets them know
they are about to be sued so they can prepare their, defense. In
these days when defendants are often insured, the notice requires
the defendant to notify his insurance carrier. None of these things
are accomplished without the formal notice. Also, a large organization is departmentalized. The fact that one department has knowledge does not mean that this information is known to another department. In this case, the patient's history taken by a treating
doctor or nurse is not likely to be passed on to the hospital's legal
counsel. The formal notice required by statute ordinarily would

be. 58

The constitutionality of the notice provision and the oneyear statute of limitations has not yet been tested. Constitutional
arguments have been made in cases to date, but in none of these
cases have the constitutional issues been properly presented on
106 Ill. App. 2d 408, 245 N.E.2d 286 (1969).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, §8-102 (1969) :
Within 6 months from the date that the injury or cause of action....
was received or accrued, any person who is about to commence any civil
action for damages on account of such injury against a local public
entity, or against any of its employees whose act or omission committed
while acting in the scope of his employment as such employee caused
such injury, must personally serve in the Office of the Secretary or
Clerk, as the case may be, for the entity against whom or against whose
employee the action is contemplated a written statement, signed by himself, his agent or attorney .... (Emphasis added.)
52 106 III. App. 2d 255, 245 N.E.2d 262 (1969).
3Id. at 257, 245 N.E.2d at 263.
50
51
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In each case, the constitutional issues were presented

for the first time on appeal and, since the arguments were not

raised nor preserved in the records of the lower courts, the higher
courts were powerless to decide these issues. It is likely that the
constitutionality of the notice and limitations provisions will be
properly challenged and that the Illinois Supreme Court will
eventually pass upon these provisions. This comment will next
consider this possible constitutional attack under article IV, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution, as that section has been interpreted by Harvey and subsequent decisions.
POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK

It is not difficult to imagine that the Illinois Supreme Court
will be called upon to test the validity of the Tort Immunity
Act under article IV, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution.
After all, it was this provision as interpreted in Harvey which
led the General Assembly to adopt a uniform act with respect
to governmental tort immunity. At least on its face, the Tort
Immunity Act appears to overcome challenges to its validity
under the special legislation provision of the Illinois Constitu-

tion. However, a closer look at the application of the Tort Immunity Act when viewed in its proper perspective to other exist-

ing grants of governmental immunity raises a serious question
as to whether the pitfall of the legislation in Harvey has indeed
been overcome.

Broadly stated, the rule under article IV, section 22, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, is that plaintiffs whose in4 In Van Meter v. Stout, 45 Ill. 2d 7, 256 N.E.2d 784 (1970), suit was
brought seeking damages for wrongful death and personal injuries allegedly
due to the negligent operation of a school bus owned by the defendant school
district and operated by its employee, defendant Stout. The circuit court,
upon motions of both defendants, entered an order dismissing the complaint
with prejudice, noting specifically that plaintiff had admitted that the
required notice had not been given. Appeal was made directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court on the grounds that sections 8-102 and 8-103 of the Tort
Immunity Act were invalid as special legislation in violation of article IV,
section 22 of the Illinois Constitution and as a denial of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
Supreme Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issues on direct appeal since it did not appear from the record that
a fairly debatable constitutional question was urged in the trial court nor
that ruling thereon was preserved in the record for review and error assigned
upon it.
The constitutionality of the six-month notice provision was again challenged in Smith v. Glowacki, 122 Ill. App. 2d 336, 258 N.E.2d 591 (1970).
The appellate court declined decision of the constitutional issues on the
ground that they were not presented to the trial court for a ruling. See also
Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968).
Plaintiff in Schear v. Highland Park, 104 Ill. App. 2d 285, 244
N.E.2d 72 (1969), contended upon appeal that the one-year statute of
limitations in favor of governmental entities was unconstitutional in view
of the fact that the general limitations period for personal injury actions
was two years. The Appellate Court. held that the constitutional issue was
waived since it was not raised in the lower court.
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juries are brought about in the same tortious manner, but who
are discriminated against through secondary classification of
defendants shall not be denied access to the courts, nor denied
full remedy, nor be limited in monetary recovery, by any statute
that legislates by class. 55 The determinative question under article IV, section 22 is whether the statutory classification is rational. 6 And to be rational, the classification must be one which
is defined by function. 57 Furthermore, the classification created
by the legislature, even though not arbitrary nor irrational on
its face, must not operate to effect a secondary classification
among persons who are similarly situated.5 8
The court in Harvey, while formulating its guideline that
future legislation classify in terms of type of municipal function, reasoned:
Many of the activities that frequently give rise to tort liability
are common to all governmental units. The operation of automobiles is an obvious example. From the perspective of the injured
party, or from the point of view of ability to insure against liability
for negligent operation, there is no reason why one who is injured
by a park district truck should be barred from recovery, while one
who is injured by a city or village truck is allowed to recover, and
one injured by a school district
truck is allowed to recover only
59
within a prescribed limit.

The municipal function which gave rise to the claim for injuries
in Harvey was the maintenance of playground facilities by the
defendant park district. The court was fully cognizant of the
fact that other governmental bodies likewise maintained recreational facilities. Among these, the court listed cities and vil55 See Expanding Application of the Special Legislation Clause of the
Illinois Constitution, 3 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PRO. 96 (1969). The author
reviews the application of article IV section 22 of the Illinois Constitution
in striking at legislation dealing with tort liability. From a review of the
recent cases, two tests are derived in evaluating a statute under article IV,
section 22. First, the court will ask if the classification created by the legislature, even though arbitrary and irrational on its face, operates to effect a
secondary classification among persons who are similarly situated. Second,
the court will look to the statute to see if the class legislated for is one that
is defined functionally. Id. at 114.
These tests may be applied to any class legislation to determine its constitutionality under article IV, section 22. The second test above was
derived from the court's guideline for future legislation in Harvey. This
test was applied in Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill. 2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274
(1966) to strike down that portion of the Corporate Name and Powers in
General Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §301.1 (1965), which granted immunity
to all counties and their agents, servants, officers or employees for injuries
caused to others as a result of their negligent acts. The reason assigned in
the decision was that the legislature had attempted to classify governmental
units, as such, without regard to similarity of function. Id. at 379, 215 N.E.
2d at 274.
56 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
57 See note 10 supra.

58 Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).

59 32 Ill. 2d 60, 65, 203 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1964).
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lages, school districts, forest preserve districts, and the state
itself.0°
Why then, if indeed function is to be an outer boundary for
any valid classification under article IV, section 22, should not
the state be treated the same as other governmental units? For
this to occur, article IV, section 22 must be reconciled with the
constitutional provision granting immunity to the state.0 1 However, this reconciliation has already been made because, the
General Assembly has, for all practical purposes, provided for
waiver of this sovereign immunity of the state by granting jurisdiction to the court of claims over:
All claims against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort,
in respect of which claims the claimants would be entitled to redress against the State of Illinois, at law or in chancery, if the
State were suable .... provided that an award for damages in a
case sounding in tort shall not exceed the sum of $25,000 to or for
the benefit of any claimant. The defense that the State ... is not
liable for the negligence of its officers, agents, and employees in
the course of their employment shall not be applicable to the hearing and determination of such claims. 62
The Tort Immunity Act eliminates from its classification:
"[t] he State or any office, officer, department, division, bureau,
board, commission, university or similar agency of the State."6
Immunity of the state derives from the Illinois Constitution and
the Court of Claims Act, not the Tort Immunity Act. Although this classification may be rational upon its face, clearly
there is no functional distinction between certain activities performed by the state or agencies thereof and by other local governmental units. So it seems that not all governmental units
performing the same function are treated uniformly. Therefore, the Tort Immunity Act does not strictly adhere to the
guidelines set down in Harvey. The Court of Claims Act provides for a two-year statute of limitations for tort actions
against the state and designated agencies of the state,6 4 as opposed to the general one-year statute of limitations provision of
the Tort Immunity Act. In the words of Harvey: "In this pattern there is no discernible relationship to the realities of life." 6
The following fact situation exemplifies the article IV, section 22 argument that would be made. Suppose, as in Harvey,
60 See text at note 12 supra.

61 ILL. CONST. art. IV, §26.

"The State of Illinois shall never be made

defendant in any court of law or equity."
62ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §439.8 (1969). In addition to the state, this
provision also applies to the Medical Center Commission, the Board of
Trustees of the University of Illinois, the Board of Trustees of Southern

Illinois University, and the Board of Governors of State Colleges and
Universities.
63
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §1-206 (1969).
64

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §439.22 (1969).

65 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 67, 203 N.E.2d 573,
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plaintiff were injured on a slide negligently maintained by a
park district. Plaintiff complies with the notice requirement of
section 8-102 by filing a timely notice on the park district. Suit,
however, is brought one year and six months after the date the
cause of action accrued. Defendant then files a motion to dismiss under section 8-101 for failure to file suit within the prescribed one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff would argue
that section 8-101 violates article IV, section 22 of the Illinois
Constitution in that section 8-101 does not apply equally to all
governmental units which perform the same function. Since
the Illinois Court of Claims Act allows suit to be brought
within two years after the accrual of a cause of action against
the state for negligent maintenance of state-owned playground
facilities, section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act does not meet
the functional classification test of Harvey, but is arbitrary,
and unconstitutionally discriminates against the plaintiff.
The Tort Immunity Act further excludes from its application: "[a]ny entity organized under or subject of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act." 86 The Metropolitan Transit
Authority Act 67 contains a one-year statute of limitations provision and six-month notice provision, somewhat similar to
those contained in the Tort Immunity Act.8 However, the sixmonth notice provision of the Metropolitan Transit Authority
Act does not apply to suits brought against employees of the
Authority, but only applies to suits brought directly against
the Authority. Therefore, while employees of all local public
entities except employees of the Metropolitan Transit Authority
are protected by a six-month notice provision, employees of the
Metropolitan Transit Authority do not enjoy the same degree
of immunity. As a result, employees of different municipal
corporations which conceivably could perform similar functions are not afforded the same degree of immunity in all cases.
Furthermore, the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act applies
only procedural limitations to suits for personal injuries brought
against the Authority, whereas the Tort Immunity Act provides
blanket shields of immunity for specific tort actions against
other local public entities or their employees, in addition to procedural limitations."9 Again, the Tort Immunity Act has failed
to afford the same treatment to all governmental units which
perform the same function.
577 (1964).
66 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, §2-101 (1969).
67 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111-%, §301 et seq. (1969).
68 ILL. REV. STAT. ch 111-%, §341 (1969).
89 See generally Kionka, Tort Liability of Local Governments and Their
Employees in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J. 620 (1970). See also Latturner, Local
Governmental Tort Immunity and Liability in Illinois, 55 ILL. B.J. 23 (1966).
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CONCLUSION

It is doubtful that the Tort Immunity Act statute of limitations and notice of injuries provisions will survive constitutional attack under article IV, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution. The shortcoming of the Tort Immunity Act is that, although the classifications proposed by the Act are rational on
their face, the Tort Immunity Act, when considered in conjunction with other legislation still in effect in Illinois, does not completely meet the functional test proposed by Harvey. The requirement of Harvey is that in order for classification to be rational under article IV, section 22, the classification should be
defined functionally. This requires that all governmental units
performing the same functions should be afforded the same
degree of tort immunity. As has been seen, the state and the
Metropolitan Transit Authority are both excluded from the
workings of the Tort Immunity Act. The immunity from torts
afforded these entities is not the same as the immunity afforded
local public entities under the Tort Immunity Act, yet functionally certain activities of the state and the Metropolitan
Transit Authority are the same as entities under the Tort Immunity Act. To this extent, Harvey has not been satisfied.
Presumably, the entire Act will not fall by virtue of these
discrepancies in functional classification, for the Tort Immunity
Act clearly provides for severability in the event that any provision or clause of the Act or the application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid 0 However, subsequent judicial
decisions may severely infringe upon the contemplated scope of
the Act.
Several possibilities exist to salvage the limitations and
notice provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. The most obvious
would be to expand the scope of the Act to include all units of
government which perform similar functions and not to limit
the scope of the Act to certain governmental entities which perform similar functions. This would mean that the Act would
encompass the state as well as agencies of the state and would
of necessity include the Metropolitan Transit Authority. Another reasonable alternative which appears to be left open is
amendment of the Illinois Court of Claims Act and the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act. Short of. these, unless some
other means is conceived through the current legislative scheme,
the notice and limitations provisions of the Tort Immunity Act
are in jeopardy of being stricken under the reasoning of Harvey.
Lyman C. Tieman
70

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, §1-102 (1969).

